We study the endogenous determination of corporate debt maturity in a setting with default risk. We assume that …rms must access the bond market and they issue debt with a ‡exible structure (coupon, face value, and maturity). Initially the …rm is in a low growth/illiquid state that requires debt re…nancing if it matures. Since lenders do not re…nance projects with positive but small net present value, …rms may be forced to default in the …rst phase. We call this liquidity risk. The technology is such that earnings can switch to a higher (but riskier) level. In this second phase …rms have access to the equity market but they may default if this is the best option. We call this strategic default risk. In the model optimal maturity balances these two risks. We show that …rms with poor prospects and …rms in more unstable industries will choose shorter maturities even if it is feasible to issue longer debt. The model also o¤ers predictions on how asset maturity, asset salability and leverage in ‡uence maturity. Even though our model is extremely stylized we …nd that the predictions are roughly consistent with the evidence. Moreover, it o¤ers some insights on the factors that determine the structure of the debt.
Introduction
The endogenous determination of the maturity structure of debt is a topic that interests both …nancial and macro economists. In the case of business …rms-the case mostly analyzed by …nancial economists-the early work of Diamond (1991) and Leland and Toft (1996) has been followed by substantial work on the optimal structure of debt. In the macro literature, Lucas and Stokey (1983) highlighted the role that debt maturity has in supporting an optimal policy. Angeletos (2009) and Buera and Nicolini (2004) study the case of non-contingent debt while Shin (2007) allows for a maturity structure that changes depending on the state of the economy. In all cases there is no default in equilibrium. In the case of sovereign debt, Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) develop a theory of debt maturity based on the relative costs of di¤erent types of debt that is consistent with the evidence that in low output periods countries issue shorter-term debt and with the presence of default. Aguiar et al. (2016) use the framework of Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) to argue that when a country must reduce debt under risk of default, it is optimal to remain passive in the long-term bond market (let those bonds mature) and use the short-term bond market to roll over part of such debt. Hatchondo et al. (2016) quantify the impact of reducing the ability of a country to dilute existing debt on average maturity and …nd it substantial. Fernandez and Martin (2015) highlight the trade-o¤ between illiquidity and maturity when the country chooses between two types of debt and there is an incentive for debt dilution. Similarly, Sánchez et al. (2018) present a model of endogenous determination of sovereign debt maturity but focus on the term structure of interest rate spreads and the impact of alternative debt rescheduling arrangements.
In this paper, we study a model of a risk neutral agent-which we interpret as a …rm-that chooses the type of debt that it will issue to …nance an initial investment. We assume that there are two phases. In the …rst phase, earnings generating process (i.e. the technology) is in a "low growth"regime with steady but low earnings. During this phase, the …rm has access only to a bond market that is used to …nance the initial investment and, if the bond matures in that phase, to re…nance the bond. Because of the limited access to external …nancing we also refer to this phase as "illiquid regime."The regime can switch stochastically to a "high growth" regime with more uncertain -but potentially much higher-earnings process. In this phase the …rm has access to perfect capital markets and, therefore, we also refer to this phase as the "liquid regime."
On the …nancing side, we allow for a general menu of noncontingent securities. We assume that the …rm can choose the structure of its debt from a continuum of securities.
These securities-that we view as bonds-are completely summarized by three parameters: the coupon rate, b; that must be paid in every period, the face value (or the value that is due at maturity), K; and a Poisson parameter, ; that determines the stochastic maturity of the bond. The expected maturity of the bond is then given by 1= :
1 Upon maturity the debt can be re…nanced.
2 This ‡exible speci…cation of the structure of debt has two major advantages over the constant maturity approach pioneered by Leland and Toft (1996) and adopted by He and Xiong (2012) and Diamond and He (2014) . First, it allows us to study debt that can be either front or backloaded, and it is a useful setting to capture the tradeo¤ between expected maturity and face value of a bond. Second, at re…nancing time, the …rm is completely free to change the structure of the debt which is essential to understand how changes in the prospects of the …rm get re ‡ected in changes in maturity. 3 We assume that both the …rm and the credit market are risk neutral and have the same discount rate. We abstract away from the strategic aspects associated with issuing short and long term debt simultaneously since there is no risk of debt dilution. Moreover, we also ignore how the liquidity of the secondary market in ‡uences the choice of maturity which has been the focus of the recent literature. Our emphasis is on the non-strategic determinants of debt maturity and the role played by technology that we take as exogenously varying on the structure of debt. We view this as an interesting exercise since our "project/technology" could be, in some applications, viewed as the outcome of a market equilibrium. In this case exogeneity of some features (e.g. variability of the growth rate of earnings) is a reasonable assumption.
To highlight some of the economic forces that underlie the choice of maturity we …rst discuss a simple version of the model that rules out re…nancing. 4 In this setting, we show that the market value of the debt relative to its safe value depends on two risk prices (or discounts). One of them captures the risk that the debt matures during the illiquid regime, while the other measures the cost of strategic default. We show how changes in the state of the …rm and the economic environment impinge upon these two prices of risk, and we …nd that disentangling these e¤ects provides intuition about the optimal maturity choice.
We tackle the analysis of the general model in the context of a quantitative exercise. We show that the structure of the debt depends both on the level of potential output and on 1 We assume that maturity is stochastic to keep the model stationary. 2 In our simple setting without an exogenous reason for issuing debt, the …rm will never choose to re…nance in the high growth/liquid regime. In this regime the optimal policy once the debt matures is to either pay it o¤ or default. 3 In a recent paper, Chen et al. (2012) use a shortcut to allow for a change in maturity when the aggregate state changes within the constant maturity model. 4 The limit to re…nancing is an extreme form of rollover risk: the probability of rolling over the debt is e¤ectively zero.
features of the project/technology. Firms whose potential output (that is, output that would obtain if the project moved from the low growth/illiquid regime to the high growth/liquid regime) is low-and hence more likely to default for strategic/solvency reasons-choose shorter bonds. As potential output increases, the risk of strategic default decreases and the optimal bond is chosen so as to decrease the risk of default associated with the bond maturing in the low growth regime. This is accomplished by increasing expected maturity of the bond at the cost of a higher face value and, hence, of a higher premium paid for strategic default.
Consider what happens when a …rm (or a country) has to re…nance its debt. If at the time of re…nancing the …rm's prospects are poor the market charges a high price for strategic risk while the level of earnings has no impact on the price of illiquidity risk in our setting. A …rm that wants to decrease the implicit price it pays for strategic risk -at the cost of increasing the price of illiquidity risk-can decrease the expected maturity of the debt. Our model implies that the lower the (optimal) value of the …rm the lower its optimal choice of maturity. An outside observer without a full understanding of the problem solved by the …rm might be tempted to reverse the direction of causality and conclude that the …rm made a "mistake"issuing short debt and this, in turn exacerbates the chances of default.
The (…xed) properties of the technology have an impact on the choice of maturity: …rms that operate in more unstable environments choose shorter maturities and we …nd that the expected maturity-output relationship is ‡atter the higher the uncertainty about growth rates. Thus, the model not only implies that …rms in high uncertainty environments borrow using more short term debt than similar …rms in a high uncertainty environment, but also that the cross sectional dispersion of expected maturities is smaller in the high uncertainty case.
Our results show that the degree of salability of the …rm's assets (or, alternatively the cost of …re sales) also in ‡uences the choice of the optimal …nancing structure. We …nd that higher post-default value of the assets results in longer expected maturities. The result is intuitive: A higher recovery rate-conditional on default-reduces the cost of strategic default and, hence its shadow price. The …rm then chooses to reduce the higher price risk-the risk of illiquidity driven default-by choosing a bond with longer duration.
For the examples that we study, we …nd that higher levered …rms (i.e. …rms with higher …nancing needs) choose shorter maturities while, at the same time, selling bonds with similar face values. Thus, unlike other features of the environment, changes in leverage have a large impact on expected maturity and a small impact on the face value of the optimal bond.
Not surprisingly, we …nd that the optimal choice of debt structure cannot be summarized as the minimization of some simple measure of cost like the excess yield. More speci…cally, we show that the optimal choice often does not imply that the excess yield is minimized.
Review of Empirical Findings
Although our theory presents a potentially important trade-o¤ determining debt maturity, we do not expect that it will account for all the variation in debt maturity in the data. Reviewing empirical studies, however, it is useful to illustrate how our simple theory can account for some key …ndings. Since the literature is very broad, we provide here a short description of the studies with determinants that are captured by our theory.
5 In Appendix A, we reproduce some of those …ndings using non-…nancial and non-regulated …rms in Standard & Poor's Compustat. 6 Barclay and Smith (1995) it is of the …rst studies using Compustat data to study debt maturity. They restrict their analysis to …rms only industrial corporate sector. Debt maturity is measured as the share of the …rm's total debt with maturity larger than 3 years, which is a very common choice given the information provided by Compustat. We focus our attention here to their …nding of a negative relationship between R&D investment / …rm value and debt maturity. This result seems to contradict our theory, which predicts that …rms with higher potential growth (as measured by the expected growth rate of earnings) would prefer to issue longer term debt. Guedes and Opler (1996) reproduce some of the …ndings in Barclay and Smith (1995) using an alternative data set with information about debt issuances. However, they …nd a positive relationship between R&D investment / sales and debt maturity. Our …ndings in Appendix A, using a broader sample of Compustat …rms, are in line with Guedes and Opler (1996) . Stohs and Mauer (1996) also use a broad sample of Compustat …rms to analyze the determinants of debt maturity. They …nd that less risky …rms use longer-term debt. A similar …nding is reported by Okzan (2002) for UK …rms. In Appendix A, we also …nd that …rms in more volatile environments tend to issue shorter-term debt. They argue that this may be because riskier …rms need to re-balance its capital structure to moderate expected bankruptcy costs. We will provide an alternative explanation to this …nding. Guedes and Opler (1996) , Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Okzan (2002) also show that …rms with longer-term asset maturities use longer-term debt. This relationship is expected from the idea of "matching principle", where …rms would like to match the maturity of their assets to the maturity of their debt in order to avoid defaulting when debt matures earlier or having little cash ‡ow from assets when debt payments remain due. In Appendix A, we also …nd that …rms with higher proportion of assets maturing at a long-term period also issue debts with longer-maturity, though this coe¢ cient is insigni…cant.
Demirgüç- Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) …nd that …rms with higher asset salability, thus higher post-default value of assets, are associated with longer maturity. This result is also consistent with the …ndings Benmelech (2009) , which reports that American railroads that used rolling stock that could be more easily redeployed (higher resale value) tended to issue longer term bonds. Our results in Appendix A are also in line with this …nding. Barclay et al. (2003) …nd that leverage is negatively associated with debt maturity. In contrast, Johnson (2003) …nd a positive relationship between maturity and leverage, and argues that …rms with high leverage choose longer term debt to avoid liquidation. This e¤ect is probably more important for …rms with very high risk of default. In fact, our results in Appendix A using Compustat …rms suggest that …rm with higher leverage (actually, with more reliance on external …nancing) prefer shorter term debt. In our theory, …rms with higher leverage would choose shorter debt maturity.
Model
In this section we describe the simplest version of the model. We study the case of a risk neutral …rm that has to incur an irreversible cost to implement an investment project. We assume that the returns of the project are completely described by a few parameters that determine the associated stochastic processes for output (or earnings). We assume that, initially the project is in the low growth/illiquid regime and has constant earnings given by z: The amount of time spent in this regime is random and distributed exponential with parameter : Denote by T the time spent in the low growth regime. At time T the technology switches from the low growth/illiquid regime to the high growth/liquid regime and net earnings/output are given by a stochastic process x t + z; where 2 (0; 1) and x t satis…es,
This formulation captures the idea that some managerial resources must be allocated to the x t -dimension and, hence, the net output from the low growth activity decreases (as captured by < 1): In what follows we view the technology as a triplet ( ; ; ). We assume that x t is known at all times. That is, the …rm-and the market-know its potential output if the technology switched to the high growth regime. We restrict the feasible technological choices to lie in a set indexed by the current potential productivity, that is, ( ; ; ) 2 (x): We assume an extreme form of moral hazard: In the illiquid regime no outsider can operate the project and, hence the …rm cannot issue equity. In the high growth regime, the …rm can issue equity and its market price would be the expected present value of earnings.
Debt Financing
In this section we assume that the …rm has to …nance either partially or totally the cost of the project issuing non-contingent debt. The …rm has access to a risk neutral credit market that will price any debt issued by the …rm using the same discount rate. Thus, none of our results are driven by either di¤erences in discount factor or di¤erences in the curvature of direct payo¤s.
We study a market where the set of feasible debt instruments is completely described by three parameters (b; K; ); where b is the coupon rate, K is the payment due at maturity (which does not necessarily coincide with the initial value of the debt) and is the parameter of a Poisson process that determines the maturity of the bond. Thus, maturity is stochastic and the maturity time is denoted T : The expected maturity of a bond is 1= :
7
We assume that if the …rm defaults on its debt in the low growth/illiquid regime, bondholders receive D B :
8 If the …rm defaults in the high growth regime bondholders receive D G .
9
Our simple version of the technology puts some restrictions on the type of bonds that the …rm can issue. Since we assumed that the …rm cannot issue equity and that earnings are z in the low growth regime, it follows that it cannot commit to paying a coupon rate that exceeds this value. Thus, the only feasible choice is b z:
If the debt matures in the illiquid regime it must be re…nanced. If the …rm cannot issue debt that raises enough revenue to pay o¤ the original debtholders, the …rm will default. This is the illiquidity risk associated with the bond. In case of default, the payo¤ to bondholders is denoted D B and shareholders receive zero. The cost of re…nancing (a …xed cost) is denoted C F : Given that in the event that the debt has to be re…nanced there is no other debt outstanding, the …rm chooses a new debt structure, (b 0 ; K 0 ; 0 ) subject only to the restriction that the market value of the debt must be at least as high as the amount to be re…nanced. Note that the …rm can hedge the risk of not being able to re…nance when it …rst issues debt by choosing the original (b; K; ) bond such that its face value, K; is small.
In the high growth/liquid regime, depending on the values of b and z the …rm has incentives to strategically default either before the debt matures (when x is low) or at maturity. Formally, this corresponds to the case in which in the high growth regime the …rm can issue equity to pay its creditors. We refer to this case as strategic default risk, or just 7 We only consider bonds that make payments that are not contingent on the state of the …rm. In particular, we rule out callable bonds. 8 For example, this includes the case in which debtholders receive a certain fraction of the value of the certain stream z; denoted by (1 L )z=r: We could interpret L as a measure of the value of the …rm in secondary markets including the changes in values associated with the probability of …re sales.
9 As in the case of the residual value of the debt in the low growth regime D G captures a variety of factors including the probability of …re sales, the strength of debtors rights and costs of bakruptcy. In our quantitative exercise we let this value depend on the value of the assets held by the …rm. default risk.
As it is standard in these models the existence of debt …nancing could potentially lead to the liquidation of the …rm and this is ine¢ cient given our assumptions about the stochastic process for earnings. Thus, debt …nancing can potentially lead to ine¢ cient liquidation, as in as in Diamond (1991) and Leland (1994) .
The Value of the Firm in the Liquid Regime
The market value of a productive …rm that has issued a (b; ; K) bond, denoted by T (x; z; b; ; K); is
Here T s = infft : x t x g is an endogenously chosen stopping time that determines default before the debt matures, and @ [T <Ts] is the indicator function of the event [T < T s ]. The …rst term is the value of net output until default or maturity, while the second term is the residual value of the …rm. The optimal default rule at maturity is very simple: Default if and only
that is, if the value of the assets falls short of the face value of the outstanding debt. Standard arguments show that T (x) satis…es the following HJB equation (where the arguments after the semicolon are suppressed to keep the notation simple):
and the boundary conditions are (if
T (x) = 0; and lim
while if b > 0; the optimal default before the debt matures is the …rms time that the process fx t g hits x ; where x satis…es the standard value matching and super-contact conditions given by, T (x ) = 0; and T 0 (x ) = 0:
Let's denote the lowest value of x that triggers bankruptcy at maturity by x: Thus,
Of course, if the face value of the debt is su¢ ciently small and the above formula implies that x(K) < 0 there is no default at maturity. Appendix A discusses the details of the solution to equation (1) but, in general, it is possible -depending on the choice of debt structureto observe the following cases:
The debt is safe. This implies no default at any time.
The debt is safe until it matures. This means that the …rm will choose to honor the coupon but potentially default at maturity.
The debt is not safe in any state. In this case-depending on x-the …rm will choose to default before the debt matures-standard strategic default-or at maturity (a type of solvency default).
The Value of the Debt in the Liquid Regime
The value of an (b; ; K) bond satis…es (as before we suppress the constants from the notation)
where
Moreover, if b > 0; then the choice of bankruptcy by the …rm implies that
If b = 0; the value of the debt must satisfy lim x!0 B(x) = 0: Since the value of risk free debt is given by
then the no-bubble condition is simply
Valuations in the Illiquid Regime
In order to describe the value of the …rm and the debt in the illiquid regime it is necessary to take a stand on the possibility that the …rm has to re…nance any debt that matures in the illiquid state. Let M (x; K) the value of a …rm that has just re…nanced a maturing bond with face value K:
Consider now the value of a …rm that has issued a (b; ; K) bond and has the function M (x; K) -that has to be determined endogenously-as its continuation value post re…nancing. We take that M (x; K) = 0 corresponds to default.
Let V (x; b; ; K; M (x; K)) be the value of the …rm in the illiquid regime when (potential) earnings are given by x and the …rm has debt characterized by the triplet (b; ; K): Note that potential earnings also depend on z; but since z is a constant we suppress it to simplify the notation. Then,
is the indicator function of the event fT < T g: The …rst term corresponds to the expected present value of net earnings, z b; until the time when either the debt matures, T < T ; and the …rm's continuation value is M (x T ; K); or the project switches to the liquid regime T < T ) and the value of the …rm is given by its valuation in this regime,
The valuation of the …rm, when the function V is C 2 ; 10 satis…es (suppressing the dependence of V on most constants):
In addition, the solution must satisfy the appropriate boundary conditions to rule out bubble solutions. An important property of the solution to this valuation problem is that the function V (x; b; ; K; M (x; K)) is increasing in M (x; K) for any given debt structure.
10 For arbitrary M (x; K) functions it is not possible to guarantee that V is C 2 : However, it is possible to show that M (x; K) must be lower semi-continuous and arguments along the line of the proof of the Feynman-Kac theorem can be used to prove that V is C 2 (in progress).
We now describe the market value of the debt, L(x; b; ; K; M (x; K)): It is given by
The value of the bond in the event that it matures in the illiquid regime depends on the value to the …rms of re…nancing. Formally,
that is, the bond gets repaid if the value to the …rm of re…nancing, net of re…nancing costs C F ; is positive. If that is not the case, the …rm defaults and the post-default value of the debt is denoted
show that the solution to equation (5) also satis…es the following HJB equation 11 :
Since increases in the re…nancing value of the …rm, M (x; K); increase the chance that a bond maturing in the illiquid regime will be repaid, it follows that the market value of the bond, L(x; b; ; K; M (x; K)); is increasing in M (x; K):
What are the constraints faced by a …rm that needs to re…nance a bond with face value K: It can issue a new debt, (b 0 ; 0 ; K 0 ) that raises K: If the market is unwilling to lend the necessary amount the …rm must default. Thus, a …rst constraint is that the market value of the new debt (b 0 ; 0 ; K 0 ) be greater than or equal to the amount to be re…nanced plus the re…nancing cost. This is simply
Since in this sequential setting the possibility of repeated re…nancing can give rise to a bubble-like solution we also impose that a debt that has zero possibility of maturing during the illiquid regime and that it gets repaid with probability one, which we denote,L(b 0 ; 0 ; K 0 ); cannot exceed the value of the project if it was debt free. Formally, we impose that
The left side of equation (8) is the value of a …rm that has zero debt, while the right side is the value of a bond with no default risk but no option to be re…nanced.
We can now describe the problem faced by a …rm that has to choose the new debt structure to re…nance maturing debt with face value K: The …rm solves the following problem,
subject to
and
We assume that if (x; K; M ) is empty then the value of the …rm is zero. We …nd it useful to view the maximized value in equation (9) as de…ning an operator H:
The the equilibrium re…nancing function -which is also the value of the …rm-is a …xed point of the operator H:
Proposition 1 There exists at least one …xed point of H:
The reason why we cannot replace the sup operator with a max operator is that the function M (x; K 0 ) is not necessarily continuous. 
Choosing the Debt Structure
The problem faced by a …rm that has to …nance its investment issuing debt is similar to the problem faced by the …rm who re…nances existing debt. If the cost of the project is C and the …rm has resources given by O then the problem of the …rm is equivalent to the de…ned by equations (9) and (10) with K = C O:
3 The One-Bond Example: Illiquidity Risk vs. Strategic Risk
In order to highlight the interplay between technological parameters and the choice of …nanc-ing we describe some results in a special case of the general model as it provides insights into the factors that in ‡uence the choice of maturity. We study two deviations relative to the general model: no re…nancing of the initial debt and no safe income ( = 0) in the liquid regime. We relax these assumptions in Section 5, where we present the numerical results. Finally, to simplify the algebra, we also assume that, upon default, bondholders get zero. 13 The relevant events in this case are:
Illiquid Regime
Firm has enough (safe) income to pay the coupon b:
If the debt matures in this regime it will be defaulted. This is the illiquidity risk.
Liquid Regime
Depending on the structure of the bond, that is the values of (b; ; K); the …rm will choose to default strategically: It is possible to model the market value of the debt in the illiquid regime as being determined by a discount over the value of a similar (b; ; K) debt with zero risk, that is, debt with no liquidity or strategic risk.
Formally, let the market value of the debt be denoted L(x; b; ; K): Without loss of generality we can de…ne two "prices" or "discount factors" which we view as capturing the way the market prices the illiquidity risk and the strategic risk. We denote by Q our measure of the price of illiquidity risk, and we label S; our measure of the price of strategic risk.
Given a (b; ; K) bond the market price of such a bond in the absence of illiquidity and strategic risk, that is if Q = S = 0; is
Given this de…nition we can view the market value of the debt as a discount relative to the riskless version. Thus, our risk prices Q and S are such that
where, anticipating the results that follow, we specify that the price of illiquidity risk -the risk that the bond matures in the illiquid regime-is independent of potential earnings x:
There is a tight connection between these risk prices and the excess yield of the debt issued by the …rm. To see this, let's denote the yield of debt with market value L(x; b; ; K) as the value of the discount rate,r; that would make the value of a riskless version of the debt using that discount rate equal its market value. Thus,
It follows that -omitting the arguments in the functions-
The excess yield of the debt issued by the …rm depends on the sum of the two risk prices. Any factors that increase this sum will result in higher excess yield.
Measuring Risk Prices
We de…ne the value of a (b; ; K) debt that has no illiquidity risk as the value of the same (b; ; K); denoted L N I (x; b; ; K); except that, if it matures in the illiquid regime, debtholders receive K: This is unlike the payo¤ of the debt issued by the …rm that in that event (maturity in the illiquid regime) pays zero to debtholders. Simple calculations show that
and we view the market value of the illiquidity risk as the di¤erence between the value of the debt with no illiquidity risk and the debt that has illiquidity risk, that is
It follows that the price of illiquidity, Q; is
Using the de…nition of the risk prices, the price of strategic risk is
Properties of Risk Prices
Price of Illiquidity Risk There are two elements that in ‡uence the price of illiquidity risk in equation (12). First, the degree of backloading of debt payments -as measured by the ratio K=(b + K)-has a positive impact on the market price of risk. Second, the maturity of the debt -as measured by -and the maturity structure of the underlying assets -as measured by -also in ‡uence the market price of illiquidity risk. It is straightforward to see that:
Expected Maturity of the Debt. Increases in expected maturity of the debt (decreases in ) decrease the price of illiquidity risk. In particular, lim !1 Q = 1 and lim !0 Q = 0: That is, short term debt bears a high implicit price of illiquidity risk while consols are priced as if there is no illiquidity risk.
Asset Maturity. Increases in the expected duration of the illiquid regime (1= ) have similar e¤ects: when the illiquid regime is arbitrarily short ( ! 1); then Q = 0: At the other end when the illiquid regimes lasts forever ( = 0) then the price of illiquidity risk is proportional to the degree of backloading.
Before discussing the price of strategic risk it is useful to be explicit about the valuation of the debt. As in section 2, let x be the lowest value of income that triggers default during the liquid regime. This threshold depends on the structure of the debt -the values of (b; ; K)-as well as the parameters de…ning the economic environment, ( ; ; ; r); but to keep the notation simple we do not make this dependence explicit.
while the optimal rule before maturity is to default the …rst time that x drops below x : This last event is associated with the stopping time T x given by T x = infft : t T and x t x g The value of the bond once the …rm is in the liquid regime, denoted B(x; b; ; K); is given by
It is immediate to show that B(x) -again suppressing most of the arguments-is an increasing function of x (see the explicit solutions in Appendix C). The value of the debt in the illiquid regime -which is the relevant one to study the choice of maturity since it is at this stage that the …rm selects the structure of the debt-is given by
It follows that the market value of the bond in the illiquid state also increasing in x; since this corresponds to a lower probability of default. Equation (13) then implies that S(x; b; ; K) is decreasing in potential earnings (x): Thus, our model implies that …rms with better prospects (higher x) face lower prices of strategic risk. S(x; b; ; K) also depends on the structure of the debt and the features of the economic environment.
We can now use the results in Appendix C to analyze the implications of changing some of the parameters. Since the details depend on the particular value of x; as well as the relationship between x and x(K); here we report some general results. A full account of the details is in Appendix C.
We …nd that:
Uncertainty. We …nd that when the degree of uncertainty -as measured by -is arbitrarily low then the market price of strategic risk depends on the face value of the bond.
-If the face value, K; is low (the precise value is given in Appendix C) we show that,
for x x I ; where x I is the level of income at which the …rm decides to go bankrupt (see Appendix C).
If the face value, K; is high then we get that
where the nonnegative functionsŜ M (x) andŜ L (x) are de…ned in Appendix C, and x II is the level of income that triggers bankruptcy in this case. At the other end -when ! 1-the price of strategic risk is higher and, independently of the state of the …rm, satis…es
In general our numerical results show that S is increasing in :
Asset Maturity. Changes in the expected duration of the illiquid regime have the following impact on the price of strategic risk:
and for x j 2 fx I ; x II g (depending, as before, on the value of K)
When the illiquid regime lasts a long time ( ! 0); the market value of the debt is governed by the illiquidity risk and, consequently the price of strategic risk is zero. At the other end, when the duration of the illiquid regime is arbitrarily short there is no illiquidity risk the price of strategic risk is high if x is low as it implies immediate default. If x is above the level that triggers instantaneous default then the price is lower but not zero since in this case the price of debt is given by the function B(x).
Expected Maturity of Debt. We …nd that
The market charges a positive price for the strategic risk in the case of long bonds ( < 1). Our numerical results show that S is decreasing in :
How can understanding the factors that move the prices of the two risks help us understand the forces that in ‡uence debt maturity? Here we present a heuristic argument that suggests a possible connection between changes in the economic environment and the choice of maturity. The next section discusses similar forces in the using our calibrated model.
Potential Earnings and Maturity
Consider a …rm that has optimally chosen the maturity of its bond and suppose that there is an increase in the value of its potential earnings, x: How should the …rm adjust the maturity of its debt if it could reissue it? A higher x implies that the price of strategic risk, S(x); is lower while the price of illiquidity risk, Q; has not changed. If the …rm decreases the expected duration of the debt (higher ) this results in a lower price of illiquidity risk and, using the limiting results as good indicators of the direction of the change, a higher price of strategic risk. Thus, in a sense, lowering maturity allows the …rm economize in the risk factor whose price has increased (strategic risk) at the cost of increasing the price of the other risk (illiquidity risk)
Uncertainty and Maturity Let us consider the impact of an increase in : According to our results (again using the limits as good indicators of movements over the whole range) this increases the price that the market changes for strategic risk, S; while the price of default risk, Q; is unchanged. What can the …rm do to compensate for those changes? If the …rm shortens the maturity of the debt (increases ) then it simultaneously it increases the price of illiquidity risk and decreases the price of strategic risk. Thus, as before, such a change in maturity has the e¤ect of economizing on the factor that became more expensive (strategic risk) by increasing the amount paid for illiquidity risk. Changing the maturity of the debt is one way of accomplishing this.
In the following section we show the quantitative implications of a calibrated version of the model that allows for re…nancing.
Quantitative Analysis

Calibration
In order to better characterize the choice of maturity we present a quantitative illustration of the full model. The only simpli…cation of the full model is that b = 0. We made this assumption because it does not a¤ect the choice of maturity. In Section 4.3 we incorporate coupons and show they are optimally chosen.
The calibration is extremely simple since there are very few relevant parameters and the results in this section are used to quantitatively illustrate our theory of debt maturity. We set the value of 3 parameters equal to zero. In particular, z and are set to zero because they are relevant only in the case in which b > 0: Similarly, the value of is also set to zero as a normalization because the relevant variable for discounting is r : There are 5 remaining parameters. The value of the cost of issuing debt, C, is set to 0.05, which is slightly above 1 percent of the amount of debt issue. The interest rate, r, is set to a standard value, 5 percent. The value determining the value of volatility of the process for x, ; is calibrated a priori at 0:2 because that is the median value for standard deviation of the …rst di¤erence of sales (see Table 4 ). The remaining 2 parameters, the Poisson parameter determining the probability of arrival of the productive phase, , and the share recovered of the value of the …rm in case of default, ; are calibrated such that the model provides reasonable predictions for the debt-to-asset ratio and debt maturity. Note, however, that to compare the model with data we need to pick which value of x better represents the state of the median …rm. We pick x such that the …rm in the model for that value of x has a debt-to-equity ratio equal to the value for the median …rm in the data. of the distribution of additional variables used here are further trimmed. Volatility is de…ned as the standard deviation of the …rst di¤erence of sales, weighted by the average total assets of the sample period.
Results
Firm Value, Bond Characteristics and Maturity
It seems useful to …rst discuss how arbitrary choices of maturity impact the value of the project and the set of feasible bonds. In this section we …x the value of potential earnings (x) at the value used in the calibration to match the median of the statistics in the data and study how changes in maturity a¤ect the value of the …rm, denoted M (x; K; K ( ); ); that has to re…nance a bond of a …xed value (K in our notation). Cost of Re…nancing (C) Uncertainty ( ) As expected, the function M (x; K; K ( ); ) is concave in maturity and, in all cases the maximum is interior. Thus, the model is consistent with a well de…ned optimal choice of maturity -the maximum of the M function-even though all market participants are risk neutral and use the same discount factor. In the base case -C = 0:05 and = 0:20-the optimal debt structure has an expected maturity close to …ve years.
The left panel of Figure 1 summarizes the impact of changes in the cost of re…nancing. If this cost decreases from the base case (C = 0:05) to C = 0:01 -that corresponds to a charge equal to 0.25% of the initial debt-the optimal maturity decreases from the base case of 5 years to less than 3. As the cost gets close to zero the optimal maturity falls below 1 year. The lower costs of re…nancing decrease the shadow cost of a bond maturing in the illiquid phase and, hence, decreases optimal maturity. We …nd that, for our parameterization, optimal maturity responds signi…cantly to changes in the costs of re…nancing.
The market value of a …rm with a given stock of debt decreases as earnings volatility increases. The right panel of Figure 1 illustrates the impact of increasing volatility about 25% for a range of maturities from 1 month to 10 years. As in the case of the cost of re…nancing the e¤ects are signi…cant. The peak of the M (x; K; K ( ); ) function in the high volatility case is attained at a maturity slightly above 3.5 years which corresponds to approximately a 25% decrease in optimal maturity.
How do the characteristics of the bond change with maturity? Figure 2 reports the face value -holding the market value of the bond constant-and the yield to maturity as a function of the expected maturity of the bond. If the …rm chooses to issue longer bonds then the face value must increase and the yield to maturity must increase as well. The market prices long maturity bonds as riskier investments. 
Face Value Yield to Maturity
As Figure 2 makes clear, the value maximizing debt structure neither picks the lowest face value (and hence the lowest probability of default) since this is attained by the shortest possible bond nor does it minimize the interest cost as measured by the yield to maturity. For example, in the base case, the …rm chooses to pay a small spread over the risk free rate to issue debt with a longer maturity even though it had available the option of issuing shorter term debt at close to zero risk premium.
The negative impact of earnings volatility also shows up in the bond characteristics. A …rm in the higher variance environment ( = 0:25) issues shorter debt that nevertheless pays a higher risk premium with very small di¤erence in the face value. The higher uncertainty gets priced by the risk neutral market as it changes the default probability as well as the likelihood that the …rm will be able to re…nance early maturing debt.
Maturity Choice and Potential Earnings
In this model the value of a 100% equity …nanced …rm, which we denote V (x); is proportional to x: In what follows we interpret lower values of V (x) as indicating (temporarily) poorly performing …rms, while higher values characterize (temporarily) highly productive …rms.
We …nd that in all experiments, optimal maturity increases with the level of potential output. We view this as an evidence that …rms that need to issue debt in "bad" times will choose to issue relatively short term debt. In all the cases that we study, the …rms could have issued longer term debt -say with the expected duration that it chooses when V (x) is slightly higher-but the tradeo¤ between cost and risk makes this unpro…table.
It is interesting to note what happens when V (x) is very low. In this case the cost of re…nancing the debt relative to the potential earnings of the project becomes too high, and the …rm chooses not to re…nance, but instead issue long-term debt with high face value. Figure 3 presents the values for key variables as potential output increases. First, Figure 3 (a) displays expected maturity. Expected maturity at a very low potential earnings is high at 7 year, which then takes a sharp decline to 3.5 years and increases steadily to about 6.5 years as potential earnings increase. The face value, which is displayed in Figures 3 (c) , shows that it follows a similar pattern as expected maturity. The bond yield spread from risk-free rate at the low potential earnings is high at 8% as shown in Figure 3 (b). As potential earnings increases and the …rms decide to re…nance its debt, yield spread decreases to a value close to 0%. Debt-to-equity shows similar pattern like yield spread with less curvature, where …rms who do not re…nance borrow as much as 1.5 times the amount of their equity, but the ratio decreases to slightly less than half as potential earnings increases. Debt-to-Equity, K /V(x, ,K )
How Does Technology In ‡uence Equilibrium Maturity?
The earnings process of the …rm is determined by four parameters: ; the expected growth rate, ; a measure of the variability of the growth rate, ; an indicator of liquidity (1= is a measure of the expected duration of the illiquid phase), and 1 ; which measure the fraction of the value of the …rm that debt holders can appropriate in case of default. Figure 4 shows the impact of changes in the …rst two parameters on the equilibrium maturity of the debt for the median …rm in our calibration data. 
Expected Growth Rate Variability Growth Rate
Firms with better growth prospects (higher ) issue longer debt. The intuition -as discussed in the case of a single bond-is that higher expected growth reduces the likelihood of default if the …rm is in the liquid regime. Thus, for a …xed maturity the market should lower the excess yield for longer maturities and the …rm …nds optimal in this case to issue longer debt.
The impact of uncertainty is almost exactly the opposite. For a bond with a given face value, increases in lower the expected value of the repayment in the liquid regime and this, in turn, increases the price. The …rm …nds it optimal then to choose a shorter bond that provides a better tradeo¤ as it can be re…nanced at a time in which (potentially) earnings are higher. Figure 5 summarizes how equilibrium maturity responds to changes in the other two technological parameters: and . Consistent with the literature that emphasizes the connection between maturity of the assets and the debt, our model implies that the shorter the duration of the illiquid regime the shorter the expected duration of the debt. The model also implies that the higher the resale value of the assets in case of default -the higher 1 -the longer the optimal maturity. A higher 1 is associated with lower costs (for the debt holders) of default in the liquid regime and, hence, it is optimal for a …rm to redesign its debt by lowering the implicit cost of illiquidity default and this is accomplished increasing average maturity. This is consistent with the …ndings of Benmelech (2009) who reports that American railroads that used rolling stock that could be more easily redeployed (higher resale value) tended to issue longer term bonds.
Appendix D shows how the other characteristics of the bond, its face value, yield spread, and debt-to-equity, vary with these parameters. As in the case of maturity, the variations trade-o¤ the risks of strategic and liquidity default. To the extent that di¤erences in technology correspond to di¤erent sectors the model implies that …rms with similar values of expected earnings (under the no distortion case) would be issuing debt with di¤erent characteristics. Figure 6 shows how the structure of the debt varies with the …nancing needs of the …rm. We interpret the resources raised by the …rm, K, as an indicator for …rms'leverage. The model implies that higher levered …rms issue shorter term bonds (panel (a)) with higher face value (panel (c)). The impact of increases in leverage on yield spread appear highly nonlinear: As K increases from the level such that the debt to equity ratio increases from 15% to 30% the model implies small changes in the spread. When K increases beyond this threshold, increases in the debt-equity ratio from 30% to 40% are associated with almost an increase in the yield spread of 70 basis points. Higher values of K just cannot be …nanced. 
Leverage
Bonds with Coupons
The previous analysis was simpli…ed because it assumed that there was no revenue during the …rst phase, z = 0, and, as a consequence, bonds were issued with no coupon, b = 0.
In this section we make minimal modi…cations to the values of the parameters to consider the role of bond coupons. In particular, the revenue during the …rst phase in increased to z = 0:1. Thus, …rms now can issue a bond with a coupon of up to b = 0:1.
To show the role of the coupon, it is useful to show how arbitrary choices of the coupon impact the value of the project, for a set of feasible bonds. Note now that there are three choices, (K; ; b): For each combination of ( ; b) considered we use the value of K such that the bond raises the desired resources. In particular, we analyze how changes in the bond coupon impact the value of the …rm, denoted M (x; K; K ( ; b); ; b); that has to re…nance a bond of a …xed value, K = 2:8; as before.
The value of potential earnings (x) is set at three values (low, or x = 0:5; medium, or x = 0:75; and high, or x = 1:8). Figure 7 shows the value of the …rm for alternative values of maturity, 1= ; exogenously chosen, as a function of the bond coupon. The top panel shows that a bond of intermediate maturity (2 years) and a large coupon (b = 0:1) would be preferred. Note there that reducing the coupon is worse for the value of the …rm for any value of maturity of the newly issued debt. For intermediate values of potential earning, x; although the maximum is achieved for a large value of the coupon as well, b = 0:1;the behavior of the value of the …rm for the alternative choices is quite di¤erent. Now, the maximum is achieved with a bond with maturity of 5 years, and conditional on that maturity the value of the …rm is increasing in the value of the coupon. However, conditional on maturity of 2 years, the optimal value of the coupon would be at an intermediate level, b = 0:04; and conditional on short maturity, no coupon would be optimal, b = 0. Finally, for a large value of potential earning, x = 1:8; the functions for 1 and 2 year maturity bonds are now decreasing in the value of the coupon, implying that no coupon would be optimal, b = 0; while an intermediate value of coupon would be optimal conditional on a bond of maturity 5 years. Overall, for large value of potential earnings, bonds with maturity of 2 years and zero coupon would be preferred. Even though we are not maximizing over the set of all possible bonds, our results suggest that:
For …rms that have projects with low value, V (x); it is optimal to issue bonds with a high coupon (b = 1 is the upper bound) and of moderate maturity (2 years in the top panel). These …rms face the highest price of strategic risk (driven by the low x) and they can economize on this factor by both frontloading the debt and choosing a relatively short maturity.
For …rms with intermediate value, the best bond still frontloads payments as it chooses the highest possible coupon but, since the higher x implies a lower price of strategic risk, it is optimal to issue longer term debt (5 years).
Finally, …rms with high values of x face low prices of strategic risk and they issue zero coupon bonds with an intermediate maturity (2 years). This implies that the only risk that bondholders face is the risk that, when the bond matures, the earnings will fall below x(K).
Conclusion
We study the optimal choice of the structure of the debt by a risk neutral agent-which we interpret as a …rm-borrowing from a risk neutral lender. The optimal maturity strikes a balance between two risks: the risk of default in the low growth (illiquid) regime and the risk of strategic default (in the high growth regime).
Several results are obtained relating the characteristics of the project (the …rm or its sector) and the choice of maturity. As the level of (potential) output increases the shadow price of the risk of strategic default goes down and the cost of default in the low growth regime goes up and, hence, it is optimal to lower the risk of default in the low growth (initial) regime by extending the maturity of the debt. The degree of uncertainty in the economic environment also in ‡uences the choice of …nancial structure. Higher uncertainty about growth rates is associated with shorter term debt. Finally, investment projects with higher value (to the lenders) upon default (e.g. higher resale value or lower cost of …re sales) and projects with lower leverage are …nanced with longer term debt.
Appendices A Maturity and Key Firms Characteristics
In this appendix we reproduce some of previous empirical …ndings. We use the non-…nancial and non-regulated …rms in Standard & Poor's Compustat from 1988 to 2006 to draw our sample of US …rms.
14 The …nal sample size is 17,169 …rm-year observations, with 3,023 di¤erent …rms.
The construction of Compustat variables is the following:
15
Debt Ratio under 3 years*: A ratio of short-term debt (DD2 + DD3 + DLC) to total debt (DLTT + DLC).
Debt Ratio under 5 years: A ratio of short-term debt (DD2 + DD3 + DD4 + DD5 + DLC) to total debt (DLTT + DLC).
R&D Investment: A ratio of R&D expenditure (XRD) to sales (SALE). This variable captures "growth opportunities,"following Guedes and Opler (1996) .
Volatility (Sales):
A ratio of standard deviation of …rst di¤erence of sales (SALE) to mean of total assets (AT) across time, weighted by the average total asset of the sample period, following by Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Okzan (2002) .
Volatility (EBITDA):
A ratio of standard deviation of …rst di¤erence of EBITDA (SALE -COGS -XSGA) to mean of total assets (AT) across time.
Return Volatility: Standard deviation of stock return, where stock return is measured by growth rate of adjusted closing price of stock (PRCCD/AJEXDI). This is a measure of return volatility.
14 We have excluded …nancial …rms from the data because the capital structure of the …nancial …rms are in ‡uenced by di¤erent factors from other sectors. Similarly, we have excluded utilities because those …rms are heavily regulated, and di¤erent debt maturity structure predictions may apply to such …rms. We have also trimmed extreme 1% of all independent variables to exclude outliers. We have discarded observations that have erroneous data for any of the variables used in the regression. To be speci…c, we have discarded any observation with short-term debt that is higher than total debt, and with current asset higher than total asset. See Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Johnson (2003) for similar practices.
15 (*) indicates variables that are included in the calibration target (Table 2) but not in the regression (Table 2A) .
Asset Maturity: Weighted average of short-term assets (ACT/COGS) and long-term assets (PPEGT/DP), where weights are de…ned as (ACT/AT) and (PPEGT/AT) respectively, following Stohs and Mauer (1996) .
Asset Salability: A ratio of total net property, plant and equipment (PPENT) to total asset (AT), following De Jong et al. (2008) .
Kaplan-Zingales index: Following equation (14), where CF = (IB + DP), DIV = (DVC + DVP), C = (CHE), LEV = (DLTT + DLC)/(DLTT + DLC + SEQ), and Q = (LSE + CSHO*PRCC -CEQ -TXDB)/(LSE). 16 We interpret a higher value of this index as more reliance on external …nancing.
Size: Logarithm of sales (SALE).
Debt-to-Equity*: A ratio of total debt (DLTT + DLC) to equity (AT -DLC).
Debt-to-Asset*: A ratio of total debt (DLTT + DLC) to assets (AT).
Earning Growth (Sales)*: A growth rate of sales (SALE) Std. Dev. of Earning Growth (Sales)*: Standard deviation of growth rate of sales (SALE).
We use the short-term debt ratio as the endogenous variable calculated as the ratio of debt that matures within 5 years period to the total debt. Table 1A reports the descriptive statistics for the constructed variables. Importantly, short-term debt is prevalent among these …rms; on average, 25 percent of the debt is longer than 5 years of maturity. And there is also large variation on debt maturity, as shown by the fact that the standard deviation of the short-term debt ratio is 30 percent. 16 The index is de…ned as following:
where CF is the cash ‡ow, Div is the dividend, C is the cash and short-term investment, Lev is the leverage, Q is the Tobin's Q and AT is the lagged total asset, following the paper by Lamont et al. (2001) . The paper argues that these variables obtained from the restricted version of ordered logit of the central regression by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) provides good explanation for the wedge that …rms face between internal and external costs of funds. See Appendix A for more details on the construction of variables. In Table 2A , we report panel-data regression on the short-term debt ratio. We also show what is the "expected"sign give the previous empirical literature. In terms of the regressions, we show several columns to argue that considering alternative measures volatility does not alter the result in any signi…cant way. We also show that we can control by sector or …rm …xed e¤ects. For some of the intuitions that will be derived later variations across sectors are important, so we also show the results controlling only by year …xed e¤ects.
We …nd that …rms/sectors with:
Higher growth opportunity ! longer debt maturity.
Higher volatility ! shorter debt maturity.
Longer asset maturity ! longer debt maturity (although not signi…cant).
Higher asset salability ! longer debt maturity.
More reliance on external …nancing ! shorter debt maturity (although signi…cant only with variation across industries).
These …ndings are quite similar to the articles discussed in subsection 1.1. However, our new theory o¤er an alternative explanation to the one usually provided in that previous literature. 
Similarly, let i be a root of
and, as before, denote by 1 the negative root and 2 the positive root. Simple calculations show that the impact of changes in upon the i mimic their e¤ect on the i : It also follows that 1 < 1 and 2 > 2 ; and lim !1 2 = 1 and lim
Recall that default at maturity happens if
We assume that, upon default, bondholders get (1 ) of the value of the assets.
Valuations There are four possible cases depending on the parameters: Case I. In this case there is no risk and the values of the equity and debt are given by
T (x; I) = x r + z r
Case II. The value of the bond is given by
where,
In this case the value of the …rm is
Case III. In this case we conjecture that the optimal default is such that x -the level of x that triggers default-is greater than x(K; z): This implies that if, for some t; x t < x then the …rm will default. However, if the stopping time T precedes such an event then the bond will be repaid in full. Thus, in this case the strategic risk is concentrated on the period before the bond matures.
The relevant HJB equation for the value of equity solves the following equation
whith standard boundary conditions
T (x ; III) = 0 and lim
and the smooth pasting condition given by
The value of the …rm is zero for x < x and (for x x )
The optimal bankruptcy decision rule is given by
Since this case requires that x x(K; z); this implies that, for the solution to be in this region, the face value of the bond must satisfy
The value of the debt is
Case IV. If the face value of the bond is su¢ ciently high then it is possible that the pre-maturity default threshold, x ; is lower than the default threshold at maturity, x(K; z): In this case it is possible that default occurs before maturity (if x drops below x and the bond has not matured) or at maturity. The values of the …rm and the bond are given by B(x; IV ) = 8 < :
x x(K; z):
The constants solve the following system of equations,
The value of the …rm is
x < x with the constants being given by the solution of the following system (imposing boundary and smooth pasting conditions)
The optimal default boundary solves
and it is immediate to verify that, the solution is greater that x(K; z) i¤
In this section we illustrate how the two prices of risk depend on properties of the economic environment. To simplify we take a special version of cases III and IV. We assume that = 0 -which corresponds to the case of no riskless income in the liquid regime-and = 1; which implies that debt holders get zero in case of default. Allowing for a more general speci…cation does not change the basic properties of the results but makes the algebra more cumbersome.
Preliminaries In this case the value of K L is given by
and default at maturity occurs if
For K K L -we label this case I-the bankruptcy threshold is
while for K K L -we label this case II-the bankruptcy threshold solves
where i (0) is the value of the corresponding root when = 0: Similarly we use i (0) as value of the root when = 0 as well.
Given the properties of K L there are some con…gurations that are not possible. For example, since lim !1 K L = 0 there is very short duration debt in case I, since for any …nite K it must be the case that -for su¢ ciently short duration 1= -K > K L : This case is also ruled out in environments with very high variance as lim !1 K L = 0 as well.
Similar considerations apply to x . For example, x I and x II both converge to zero as ! 1 since the high option value of not defaulting dominates. Moreover, x II converges to zero when expected duration goes to zero. Finally, for consols (i.e. ! 0) we have that
Risk Prices The price of illiquidity risk, which we label Q is independent of the state and given by
The price of strategic risk during the illiquid regime -the relevant one when it comes to analyzing re…nancing decisions-depends on whether the …rm is in case I or II and on the particular value of potential earnings, x:
Case I In this case the prices of risk di¤er depending on whether the state, x; is above -which we label L H -or below -denoted L L -the threshold that would trigger default in the liquid regime. Standard calculations show that
Case II In this case the optimal default threshold before the debt matures, x II ; lies below the default threshold at maturity, x(K): This de…nes three regions in terms of the value of potential earnings that require di¤erent treatment. We de…ne the market value of the debt L 
where the constants satisfy
Given the market value of the bond, L(x); the price of strategic risk is (see equation (6) S(x; b; ;
Maturity and Risk Prices In this section we report the limiting values of the two risk prices in case of a short bond (1= ! 0) and a consol (1= ! 1): we …nd that 
Uncertainty and Risk Prices Table C .2 reports the behavior of the risk prices as a function of : Since Q -the price of illiquidity risk-is independent of the degree of uncertainty we only report the values for the price of strategic risk. 
In these formulas we use Illiquidity and Risk Prices In the model 1= is the expected durantion of the illiquid regime. The price of illiquidity risk responds to changes in in a very intuitive way 
E Algorithm for Numerical Solution
The algorithm is based on value function interation.
1. Solve for the valuation of the …rm T (x; ; K) and bond B(x; ; K) in the liquid regime using the solution given in the Appendix C. Note that the valuation of the …rm and bond in the liquid regime does not change 2. Solve for the valuation of the …rm V 1 (x; ; K) and bond L 1 (x; ; K) in the illiquid regime using the solution given in the Appendix C. This will served as an initial guess.
3. Find the optimal value of the …rm that needs to be re…nanced such that M 1 (x; K) = max (b 0 ; 0 ;K 0 ) V 1 (x; b 0 ; 0 ; K 0 ) such that L 1 (x; b 0 ; 0 ; K 0 ) K:
4. Solve for V 2 (x; ; K) and L 2 (x; ; K) using M 1 (x; K), following the equations given in (3) and (4).
If jV
2 (x; ; K) V 1 (x; ; K)j + jL 2 (x; ; K) L 1 (x; ; K)j < , …nish. Otherwise, V 1 (x; ; K) = V 2 (x; ; K) and L 1 (x; ; K) = L 2 (x; ; K); and go back to step (3).
F Optimal Maturity with Zero Cost
In this appendix we consider the case in which there is no cost in re…nancing a loan and the safe income, z; is equal to zero. To simplify we study only the case of a pure discount bond, that is, b = 0:
The conjecture is that in that case the optimal maturity will be zero (i.e. = 1): To check this conjecture we set the value of re…nancin to the …rm, M (x); equal to what would be the value of a …rm that issues zero maturity bonds and, hence, that it keeps its principal constant and default only occurs in Phase II (high growth) whenever x < x(K): Thus, we conjecture that if the …rm takes this continuation payo¤ as given and bonds are priced as if there is zero probability of default in Phase I (because of re…nancing) then the optimal choice of a bond, the optimal ( 0 ; K 0 ); equals (1; K); where K is the initla leve of investment and, moreover, that the resulting value of the …rm under this choice is indeed equal to the conjectured M (x):
First, we display the …nal equation (so that the problem can be computed) and then we describe the logic.
The value of the …rm, V (x; ; K), has two branches, one corresponding to x x(K) -which we label H-and the other when x < x(K), that we denote by L: The lower brancjh is
where M The value of the bond is given by the L(x) function. As in the previous case, it has two branches
where B 
where B Let be the natural order in the space of functions. Thus F G i¤ for all (x; K) F (x; K) G(x; K): Since M (x; K 0 ) is a continuation value of the …rm V (x; b 0 ; 0 ; K 0 ; M (x; K 0 )) increasing in M (x; K 0 ). Moreover, higher continuation values increase the likelihood that the debt will be repaid at maturity. Thus the set (x; K; M ) is also increasing (in the set inclusion sense) in M (x; K 0 ): Let M be the set of functions that satisfy 0 M (x; K) x=(r ):
Then, it follows that H maps M into itself. Moreover, M is a complete lattice and hence the Knaster-Tarski theorem implies that the set of …xed points is nonempty. This completes the argument.
